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Abstract
Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is
called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the in-
vasion of any other mutant strategy. Recent studies have revealed that population structure
can considerably affect evolutionary dynamics. Here we derive the conditions of evolu-
tionary stability for games on graphs. We obtain analytical conditions for regular graphs
of degree k > 2. Those theoretical predictions are compared with computer simulations
for random regular graphs and for lattices. We study three different update rules: birth-
death (BD), death-birth (DB), and imitation (IM) updating. Evolutionary stability on sparse
graphs does not imply evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population, nor vice versa. We
provide a geometrical interpretation of the ESS condition on graphs.
Key words: evolutionary game theory, evolutionary graph theory, ESS, structured
population, spatial games
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* 3. Manuscript1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency dependent selection (Maynard
Smith 1982,Hofbauer &Sigmund 1998,Nowak& Sigmund 2004,Nowak 2006).
The ﬁtness of an individual is not constant, but depends on interactions with other
individuals. These interactions can be described by a game. The payoff from the
game affects ﬁtness, which is reproductive success. Reproduction can be genetic or
cultural.
An important concept in evolutionary game dynamics is that of an evolutionar-
ily stable strategy (ESS) (Maynard Smith & Price 1973, Maynard Smith 1974,
1982). If all players of a population adopt that strategy, then no mutant strategy
can invade. The traditional ESS condition is deﬁned for inﬁnitely large, well-mixed
populations.In a well-mixedpopulation,every individualinteracts with every other
individualequallylikely.Real populationsare, ofcourse, neitherinﬁnitelylargenor
well-mixed. Various attempts have been made to extend the ESS concept to popu-
lations of ﬁnite size (Maynard Smith 1988, Schaffer 1988, Ficici & Pollack 2000,
Neill 2004, Nowak et al. 2004, Wild & Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al. 2006).
In spatial evolutionarygame theory (Nowak & May 1992), the players of a popula-
tion are arranged on a spatial grid and interact with their nearest neighbors. Spatial
games can lead to very different evolutionary dynamics than games in well-mixed
populations (Nowak & May 1992, 1993, Wilson et al. 1992, Ellison 1993, Herz
1994, Lindgren& Nordahl 1994, Nowaket al. 1994, Killingback&Doebeli 1996,
2Nakamaru et al. 1997, 1998, Eshel et al. 1998, 1999, Szab´ o & T˝ oke 1998, van
Baalen & Rand 1998, Szab´ o et al. 2000, Szab´ o et al. 2005, Hauert 2001, Irwin
& Taylor 2001, Hauert et al. 2002, Szab´ o & Hauert 2002, Le Galliard et al.
2003, Hauert & Doebeli 2004, Ifti et al. 2004, Santos & Pacheco 2005, Santos et
al. 2006, Szab´ o & F´ ath 2007). Spatial models have also been studied in ecology
(Levin 1974, Levin & Paine 1974, Durrett & Levin 1994, Hassell et al. 1994,
Tainaka 1994, Durrett & Levin 1997, 1998, Tilman & Karieva 1997, Iwasa et al.
1998, Haraguchi & Sasaki 2000, Neuhauser 2001, Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani
2001, Wootton 2001, May 2006) and population genetics (Wright 1943, Kimura
1953, Kimura & Weiss 1964, Maruyama 1970, 1971, Nagylaki 1992, Epperson
2003). Literature ofkin selection is useful in analyzing spatial games(Taylor 1992,
Taylor & Irwin 2000, Rousset 2004, Lehmann et al. 2007, Taylor et al. 2007)
Evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al. 2005, Ohtsuki et al. 2006, Ohtsuki
& Nowak 2006a,b, Pacheco et al. 2006a,b, Taylor et al. 2007) is the extension
of spatial evolutionary dynamics to general graphs and networks. The members of
a population occupy the vertices of a graph. Interactions occur between connected
individuals.Many different update rules are possible. Competition for reproduction
and playingthegamecan be described bythesamegraph orby twodifferent graphs
(Ohtsuki et al. 2006, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006a,b, Ohtsuki et al. 2007a,b). A well-
mixed population is deﬁned by a complete graph with identical weights. Spatial
games are typically described by regular lattices.
The purpose of this paper is to derive the ESS condition for games on graphs.
3The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the deﬁnition of evo-
lutionary stability in a well-mixed population. In Section 3, we introduce three
different update rules and formulate the replicator equation on graphs (Ohtsuki &
Nowak 2006b). Section 4 describes our main results. We give geometrical repre-
sentations of the ESS conditions on graphs in Sections 5 and 6. We offer examples
and computer simulations in Section 7. Finally, we provide a discussion in Section
8.
2 Evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population
Consider a game between two strategies, A and B. The payoff matrix is given by

 


A B
A a b
B c d

 

. (1)
In a well-mixedpopulationevery playermeetsevery otherplayerequallylikely.Let
xA and xB be the frequencies of A and B players in the population. The average
payoffs of A and B players are given by
PA = axA + bxB
PB = cxA + dxB.
(2)
A population of A individuals is challenged by a small fraction of B invaders.
The relative abundance of B players is xB = ǫ, where 0 < ǫ ≪ 1. The fraction
of A players is xA = 1 − ǫ. Strategy A is evolutionary stable if PA > PB for
4(xA,xB) = (1 − ǫ,ǫ). This condition leads to
(a − c)(1 − ǫ) + (b − d)ǫ > 0. (3)
For ǫ → 0, the left hand side of (3) is positive if and only if
ESS: ‘a > c’ or ‘a = c and b > d’. (4)
The condition, b > d, is only used in the knife-edge case, a = c.
The evolutionary stability of a strategy in a game with n strategies can be deﬁned
in a similar way. A strategy is ESS if and only if condition (4) holds in pairwise
comparison with each of the n − 1 other strategies.
The traditional stability concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium (Nash
1950, Luce & Raiffa 1957, Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, Binmore 1994, Weibull
1995, Samuelson 1997). For payoff matrix (1), strategy A is called a ‘Nash equi-
librium’ if and only if
Nash: a ≥ c. (5)
Condition (5) implies that A is a best reply to itself. In addition, strategy A is called
a ‘strict Nash equilibrium’ if and only if
Strict Nash: a > c. (6)
Condition (6) implies that A is the unique best response to itself. Note that if A is a
strictNash equilibriumthenit isan ESS. If Aisan ESS thenitis aNash equilbrium.
While the condition for a Nash equilibrium depends only on the payoff matrix, a
5meaningful concept of evolutionary stability is affected by population size (Schaf-
fer 1988,Ficici&Pollack 2000,Nowaketal. 2004,Wild&Taylor 2004,Traulsen
et al. 2006) and population structure (Nowak & May 1992, 1993, Nakamaru et al.
1997, Le Galliard et al. 2003).
3 Evolutionary game dynamics on graphs
In this section, we introduce three different update rules for evolutionary games on
graphs (Ohtsuki et al. 2006, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006a,b). Then we discuss the
‘replicator equation on graphs’ (Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006b).
We consider an inﬁnitely large population. The structure of the population is de-
scribed by an inﬁnite, connected, and regular graph of degree k. A graph is called
‘regular’ when each node has exactly the same number of neighbors; that number
is called the ‘degree’ of the graph. Each node represents a player whose strategy is
either A or B. There are no empty nodes. In this paper, we study k > 2. For games
on cycles, k = 2, we refer to Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006a).
Each player interacts with all k neighbors, and obtains an accumulated payoff, de-
noted by P. The accumulated payoff is translated into ﬁtness, F, by the following
formula:
F = (1 − w) + w   P. (7)
Here 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 represents the intensity of selection. If w = 0 then ﬁtness is
constant, F = 1, and independent of the payoff. Throughout the paper, we consider
6the case of small w, given by 0 < w ≪ 1.
Given the ﬁtnesses of all players, we update the strategy of one player in each ele-
mentary time step. Therefore updating is asynchronous. We consider the following
three update rules (Ohtsuki et al. 2006, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006a,b):
• Birth-Death (BD) updating. An individual is chosen for reproduction propor-
tional to ﬁtness; the offspring replaces a randomly chosen neighbor.
• Death-Birth (DB) updating. A random individual is chosen to die; the k neigh-
bors compete for the empty site proportional to their ﬁtness.
• Imitation (IM) updating. A random player is chosen for updating his strategy;
he either adopts a strategy of one of his k neighbors or remains with his own
strategy, proportional to ﬁtness.
Using the pair approximation method (Matsuda et al. 1987, 1992, Nakamaru et
al. 1997, 1998, Keeling 1999, van Baalen 2000), Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006b) have
shown that for small w the frequencies of strategies on a regular graph of degree
k can be described by a differential equation. For a n × n game with the payoff
matrix, [aij], it is given by
˙ xi = xi


n  
j=1
xj(aij + bij) − φ

. (8)
Here xi denotes the frequency of i-th strategy, a dot represents time derivative,
and φ =
 n
i,j=1xixj(aij + bij). For each update rule, the value of bij in eq.(8) is
7calculated from the original payoff matrix, [aij], as
BD : bij =
aii + aij − aji − ajj
k − 2
DB : bij =
(k + 1)aii + aij − aji − (k + 1)ajj
(k + 1)(k − 2)
IM : bij =
(k + 3)aii + 3aij − 3aji − (k + 3)ajj
(k + 3)(k − 2)
.
(9)
Interestingly, differential equation (8) has the form of a replicator equation (Taylor
& Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et al. 1979, Zeeman 1980, Weibull 1995, Hofbauer
& Sigmund 1998, Nowak 2006) with a transformed payoff matrix, [aij + bij].
Therefore, many aspects of evolutionary dynamics on graphs can be analyzed by
studying a standard replicator equation with a transformed payoff matrix, a so-
called ‘replicatior equation on graphs’. For example, for the 2 × 2 payoff matrix,
(1), Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006b) have shown that the transformed payoff matrix is

 


A B
A a b + h
B c − h d

 

. (10)
The modiﬁer h depends on the update rule. It is given by
BD : h =
a + b − c − d
k − 2
DB : h =
(k + 1)a + b − c − (k + 1)d
(k + 1)(k − 2)
IM : h =
(k + 3)a + 3b − 3c − (k + 3)d
(k + 3)(k − 2)
.
(11)
These results hold for inﬁnitely large population size and for 0 < w ≪ 1. Re-
garding a ﬁnite population of size N, Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006b) found that the
8replicator equation on graphs gives a good approximation if Nw ≫ 1.
In the next section, we use eqs.(10) and (11) to derive the concept of evolutionary
stability for graph selection.
4 ESS conditions on graphs
In order to characterize evolutionary stability on graphs, we ask whether rare mu-
tants (of ǫ fraction) have an selective advantage over residents. According to the
modiﬁed payoff matrix (10), if a > c − h then rare B mutants are selected against
in an A-population. In this case, A is ESS when compared to B. If a < c − h then
B can invade A and, therefore, A is not an ESS. We do not discuss the evolutionary
stability of the ‘knife-edge’ case, a = c − h, because it is ungeneric. Throughout
the paper we call
ESS on graphs: a > c − h. (12)
the ‘ESS condition on graphs’.
In contrast to the ESS condition on graphs, the conditions for (strict) Nash equilib-
rium on graphs are not obtained from the modiﬁed payoff matrix, (10). By analogy
to its counterpart in a well-mixed population, a straightforward deﬁnition of (strict)
Nash equilibrium on graphs is as follows: a strategy is a (strict) Nash equilibrium
on graphs if no one gains a (strictly) higher payoff by switching to the other strat-
egy. Therefore, the conditions for (strict) Nash equilibrium on graphs are the same
as those in a well-mixed population, eqs.(5, 6). On graphs, it is possible that a strict
9Nash equilibrium is not an ESS. It is also possible that an ESS is not a Nash equi-
librium. We will discuss this issue further in Section 7.1.
For the three update rules, condition (12) is rewritten as follows:
ESS on graphs (BD updating):
(k − 1)a + b > (k − 1)c + d (13)
ESS on graphs (DB updating):
(k
2 − 1)a + b > (k
2 − k − 1)c + (k + 1)d (14)
ESS on graphs (IM updating):
(k
2 + 2k − 3)a + 3b > (k
2 + k − 3)c + (k + 3)d (15)
All these conditions converge to a > c for k → ∞. This makes sense, because a
well-mixed population is described by a fully connected graph.
5 The geometry of evolutionary stability
We can provide a beautiful geometrical representation of the ESS conditions (13-
15). Figure 1 illustrates the invasion of a homogeneous A population by an ǫ frac-
tion of B players. Initially the B players are sprinkled randomly over the entire
population: each vertex changes from A to B with probability ǫ, which is very
10small. The following evolutionary dynamics have two time scales: (i) on a fast
time scale the population ‘equilibrates’ locally and B-clusters are formed, (ii) on a
slower time scale the global frequency of A (and B) is changing. This separation
of time scales is a consequence of the weak intensity of selection, 0 < w ≪ 1
(Ohtsuki et al. 2006).
Afterthelocalequilibrationprocess,weﬁndthat,aB player, whoseoneneighboris
already speciﬁed, has on average one B neighbor among his k−1 other neighbors.
Thus, in order to intuitively understand the ESS conditions on graphs, (13-15), it is
convenient to use a schematic drawing where a half-line of B players is embedded
in a sea of A players (Fig. 2). If the tip of the half-line is more likely to shrink than
to extend, then A is ESS. Otherwise selection favors the invasion of B.
For example, let us study the invasion dynamics for DB updating. The half-line of
B-players extends in length by one if (i) one of the (k − 1) A-neighbors of the B-
player on the tip is chosen to die and (ii) the B-player, whose payoff is (k−1)c+d,
wins the competition over the vacancy against (k − 1) A-players, whose payoff is
ka. These events occur with a probability that is proportional to
(k − 1)  
(1 − w) + w{(k − 1)c + d}
[(1 − w) + w{(k − 1)c + d}] + (k − 1)[(1 − w) + w   ka]
(16)
A similar calculation shows that the half-line of B-players shrinks in length by one
with a probability proportional to (up to the same constant)
1  
(k − 1)[(1 − w) + w{(k − 1)a + b}]
(k − 1)[(1 − w) + w{(k − 1)a + b}] + [(1 − w) + w{(k − 2)c + 2d}]
. (17)
11For small w, it is easy to see that probability (16) being smaller than probability
(17) is equivalent to the ESS condition for DB updating, (14). The ESS conditions
for BD and IM updating rules, (13) and (15), can be derived in the same way.
6 Intuitive counting over one contested edge
There is a simple, intuitive way to derive the ESS conditions on graph, (13-15).
Again we consider the tip of the half-line of B players. The trick to derive the ESS
conditions,(13-15),istosumupthepayoffsofallplayersinvolvedinthemovement
of an edge extending from the tip (=a boundary between A and B players), but
separately for A-players and for B-players. Then we compare these total payoffs to
see which replacement is more likely to occur at the boundary. If the total payoff
of strategy A exceeds that of B, then strategy A is an ESS on graphs.
Figure 3 shows the calculation for birth-death (BD) updating. The two players at
the boundary are involved in the contest (they are marked with circles). The A-
player has payoff (k−1)+b. The B-player has payoff (k−1)c+d. Comparison of
these two payoffs immediately leads to the ESS condition for BD updating, (13).
Figure 4 describes death-birth (DB) updating. We focus on the movement of the
boundary which is shown as a dotted line. There are two possibilities.
(i) If the A-player at the boundary dies (top panel), his (k − 1) A-neighbors and
one B-neighbor compete for the empty site. Each of the (k−1) A-neighbors has
12payoff ka, and has one B-opponent. The B-player has payoff (k − 1)c + d. He
has (k − 1) A-opponents. Therefore, his ‘weight’ is k − 1.
(ii) If the B-player at the boundary dies (bottom panel), one A-neighbor and one
B-neighbor(marked withcircles) are relevantfor the movementof theboundary.
Notice that other A-neighbors are NOT involved in the movement of the bound-
ary, because if one of them replaces the vacancy a different boundary moves.
The A-player has payoff (k − 1)a + b and has one B-opponent. The B-player
has payoff (k − 2)c + 2d and has one A-opponent.
Comparing the two weighted total payoffs reproduces our ESS condition for DB
updating, (14). Figure 5 shows how to derive the ESS condition for IM updating.
7 Numerical examples and computer simulations
7.1 Examples
We will now study some examples, which elucidate the difference between ESS in
well mixed populations and on sparse graphs.
13Let us ﬁrst consider the following game:

 


A B
A 1 3
B 2 0

 

. (18)
In this example, strategy A is not an ESS in a well-mixed population. However, it is
an ESS on a regular graph of degree k = 3 for all update rules (BD, DB, and IM).
Thereasonforthisdiscrepancybetweenwell-mixedpopulationsandgraph-structured
populations can be understood as follows. Imagine that strategy A dominates the
population and that a B-mutant tries toinvade it. The average payoff of the B-
mutant per game is 2. In a well-mixed population, the average payoff of A players
is 1. Hence, strategy A is not evolutionarily stable. However, in a graph-structured
population, the payoff of the A-neighbors of the B-mutant affects selection. These
A-neighbors gain payoff, 3, from the interaction with the B-mutant, which exceeds
the mutant’s payoff, 2. Therefore, the B-mutant fails to invade the population.
The game (18) is an example where strategy A is not a Nash equilibrium, but is an
ESS on graphs.
As a second example, consider the game:


 

A B
A 2 0
B 1 3


 
. (19)
Strategy A is an ESS in a well-mixed population. However, it is not an ESS on a
14regular graph of degree k = 3 for all three update rules (BD, DB, and IM).
Imagine that A players dominate the population. Their payoff per game is 2. When
a B mutant invades the population, his payoff per game is 1. Therefore, strategy A
resists invasion by strategy B in a well-mixed population. However, we notice that
A players in the neighborhood of the invading B-player gain payoff, 0, from the
game with B. Strategy B considerably reduces the payoff of its A-neighbors. On
graphsitcanbeadaptivetoweakenneighborswithwhomonecompetes(Nakamaru
et al. 1997, Nakamaru & Iwasa 2005).
The payoff matrix (19) is an example for a game where strategy A is a strict Nash
equilibrium, but is not an ESS on graphs.
As a third example, consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Rapoport & Chammah
1965, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). Cooperation (C) costs c for the donor and yields
beneﬁt, b, for the recipient. Defection (D) yields zero payoff to both players. The
payoff matrix is





C D
C b − c −c
D b 0




. (20)
In a well-mixed population, defection (D) is the unique ESS of the game. It is also
true for games on graphs under BD updating. However, as is shown in Ohtsuki
& Nowak (2006b), cooperation is the only ESS on a graph of degree k under DB
updatingwheneverb/c > k issatisﬁed.ForIM updating,b/c > k+2is thedecisive
condition for cooperation to be the unique ESS on graphs.
15For the more general Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix,


 

C D
C R S
D T P


 
, (21)
where T > R > P > S, it is possible that both cooperation and defection are ESSs
on graphs. It is also possible that neither of them is an ESS on graphs (see Ohtsuki
& Nowak (2006b)) depending on the parameter values and the degree of the graph,
k.
7.2 Computer simulations
In order to test the validity of our analytic results, eqs.(13-15), we have run ex-
tensive computer simulations for each of the three update rules. We have studied
random regular graphs of degrees k = 3,4,5,6 and lattices of degrees k = 3,4,6.
We study a population of size N = 104. At the beginning of each run, 100 random
vertices are changed for A to B. We run simulations for 5 generations, or equiv-
alently, 5N asynchronous updating steps. This means that each player in the pop-
ulation experiences, on average, 5 potential updating events. After 5 generations,
we count the number of B players in the population. We conducted simulations 104
timesfor each set of parameters. Each data pointin ourresultrepresents theaverage
number of B players after 5 generations over 104 runs . In studying random regular
graphs, we generate a new graph every 102 runs, in order to avoid the effect of a
16particular conﬁguration of a graph. Throughout our simulations, we use w = 0.01.
Therefore we have Nw = 100, which meets the requirement of Nw ≫ 1.
Figure 6 shows the result of computer simulations for random regular graphs. Note
that the analytic predictions, eqs.(13-15), agree well with the simulations. Each
column of panels in Figure 6 corresponds to one of the three update rules, BD
(left), DB (center), and IM (right). In the upper three panels, we study the payoff
matrix, (a,b,c,d) = (0,b,1,0). Equations (13-15) predict that strategy A is an ESS
if
BD : b > k − 1
DB : b > k
2 − k − 1
IM : b >
k2 + k − 3
3
.
(22)
In the lower three panels, we study (a,b,c,d) = (1,0,0,d). In this case our predic-
tions, eqs.(13-15), tell us that strategy A is an ESS if
d < k − 1 (23)
for all three update rules.
In Figure 7, we show the results of computer simulations for lattices of degrees
k = 3 (triangular), k = 4 (square), and k = 6 (hexagonal). We ﬁnd very good
agreement between thesimulationsand thetheoretical predictionsfor thetriangular
lattice, fairly good for the square lattice, but no good agreement for the hexagonal
lattice.
17The reason for this deviationcan beunderstood as follows.The calculationsof Oht-
suki & Nowak (2006b) are based on pair approximation, which is mathematically
correct for Bethe lattices (= Cayley trees), that have no loops. However, both ran-
dom regular graphs and lattices contain many loops. The existence of loops causes
a discrepancy between simulation results and analytic conditions. The precision of
the pair approximation depends on the length, L, of the existing loops. The smaller
L is, the worse pair approximation tends to be.
For Bethe lattices we have L = ∞. Thus pair approximation is correct. For large
random regular graphs, L is usually very large. For triangular, square, and hexago-
nal lattices, however, there are many loops with length L = 6,4 and 3, respectively
(see Figure 8). Therefore, for those lattices we expect that predictions based on pair
approximation do not work well.
8 Conclusion
We have derived ESS conditions for games on regular graphs of degree k. A resi-
dent strategy, A, can resist invasion by a small fraction of B players if
BD updating: (k − 1)a + b > (k − 1)c + d
DB updating: (k
2 − 1)a + b > (k
2 − k − 1)c + (k + 1)d
IM updating: (k
2 + 2k − 3)a + 3b > (k
2 + k − 3)c + (k + 3)d
(24)
The parameters, a,b,c,d, denote the entries of the payoff matrix, (1), which deﬁnes
the game between strategies A and B. The ESS conditions (24) hold for a weak
18intensity of selection, 0 < w ≪ 1, and for inﬁnitely large population size.
For well-mixed populations, which are given by the complete graph, k → ∞, all
three conditions converge to a > c. Thus, for inﬁnite k, the decisive criterion is
what does the resident get from itself, a, compared to what does the invader get
from the resident, c. But for ﬁnite k, the payoff values b and d also matter; it is
crucial to know, what the resident gets from the invader, b, and what the invader
gets from itself, d.
For BD updating, a is as important as c (both parameters have the same weight,
k − 1, in the ESS condition), and b is as important as d. For DB and IM updating,
however, a is more important than c, and b is less important than d. For all three
update rules, we ﬁnd that a and c enter into the ESS conditionswith greater weights
than b and d.
The traditional ESS criterion of well-mixed populations is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient to guarantee evolutionary stability in structured populations.
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28Figure Legends
Figure 1 Local conﬁguration of rare B mutants quickly equilibrates into clusters,
without changing the total number of initial B players.
Figure 2 A schematic drawing where rare B-mutants invade the population of A-
players in a half-line shape. The number shown next to player is his payoff. When
the half-life is more likely to shrink than to extend, strategy A is an ESS.
Figure 3 A simple way to reproduce the ESS condition for BD updating. The focal
boundary is drawn in a dotted line. Those who are involved in the movement of the
boundary are marked in circles. Payoffs are shown next to players.
Figure 4 A simple way to reproduce the ESS condition for DB updating. The focal
boundary is drawn in a dotted line. Those who are involved in the movement of the
boundary are marked with circles. Payoffs are shown next to players. Top: when the
A-player at the boundary dies. Bottom: when the B-player at the boundary dies.
Figure 5 A simple way to reproduce the ESS condition for IM updating. The focal
boundary is drawn in a dotted line. Those who are involved in the movement of the
boundary are marked with circles. Payoffs are shown next to players. Top: when the
A-player at the boundary dies. Bottom: when the B-player at the boundary dies.
Figure 6 Computer simulation results for random regular graphs of degrees k = 3
(blue), k = 4 (green), k = 5 (orange), and k = 6 (red). Each column of panels
in the ﬁgure represents one of the three update rules, BD (panels in the left), DB
29(panels in the center), and IM (panels in the right). In the top three panels, we
study the parameter (a,b,c,d) = (0,b,1,0) so b is the only free parameter, which
is shown in each x-axis. In the bottom three, we study the parameters (a,b,c,d) =
(1,0,0,d),so d is the free parameter shown in each x-axis. They-axis of each panel
represents the average number of B players after 5 generations over 104 runs. In
each small panel, the initial number of B players, that is nB = 100, is shown by
the black horizontal dotted line. Thus, the number of B players after 5 generation
being below this threshold, nB = 100, implies that strategy A is an ESS. For each
degree k, simulation results are plotted in a corresponding color with ‘x’-symbols.
A colored vertical dotted linerepresents the theoretical prediction,eqs.(22-23). The
simulation data show a perfect agreement with theoretical predictions if both data
plots and a vertical dotted line in the same color intersect with the black horizontal
dotted line exactly at the same point.
Figure 7 The average number of B players after 5 generations, for lattices of de-
grees k = 3 (triangular, in blue), k = 4 (square, in green), and k = 6 (hexagonal,
in red). All the others conditions, such as update rules and parameters used, are
the same and in the same order as in Figure 6. We ﬁnd that results for hexagonal
lattices (in red) show a particularly poor agreement with theoretical predictions.
Figure 8 The length of the minimal loop, L, is shown for triangular, square, and
hexagonal lattices, respectively.
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Figure 8